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The ‘Public’ and the ‘Private’  
in Sixteenth-Century Venice:  
From Medieval Economy to Early Modern State 
Claire Judde de Larivière ∗ 
Abstract: »Das ‘Öffentliche‘ und das ‘Private‘ im Venedig des sechzehnten 
Jahrhunderts: Von der mittelalterlichen Ökonomie zum frühmodernen Staat«. 
This article analyses the Venetian public galleys’ expeditions during the six-
teenth century, as a case study for understanding the relationships between 
patricians and the State, and the way in which the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ 
roles were reorganized in the late Middle Ages. Going further the explanations 
usually given, the article tries to explain the decline of the public galleys, and 
emphasizes the symbolic, cultural, political and ideological factors that had also 
led to the abandonment of public navigation. It seeks to reintegrate economic 
considerations, practices, actions and actors into their social, political and ideo-
logical contexts, and thus avoids isolating economic phenomena and economic 
thinking from their political background. Doing so, it argues that the aban-
donment of public navigation in Venice was the corollary of the gradual differ-
entiation between the State and the ruling class that was typical of the earliest 
stages of modernity. 
Keywords: Venice, navigation, trade, moral economy, economics of convention, 
public/private, early modern State. 
1.  Introduction 
Public galleys and their prestigious cargo symbolised the Venetian economy of 
the late Middle Ages and were integral to the economic prosperity of the 
Serenissima (Lane 1933; Lane 1934; Doumerc 1991; Stöckly 1995; Judde de 
Larivière 2008). Despite their success for almost two centuries, their activity 
actually began to decline from the beginning of the sixteenth century, and 1569 
marked the end of this system which had characterised medieval Venetian 
trade.  
The abandonment of the public galleys’ expeditions has generally been seen 
as marking the end of the Venetian State’s direct involvement in trade and as 
one of the first symptoms of the economic decline of the Serenissima. It has 
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been analysed in the context of the European expansion of the sixteenth century 
which diminished the Mediterranean as well as the Venetian centrality in trade, 
and in relation to the Ottoman progression in the Mediterranean and the rise of 
new economic powers (Luzzatto 1954; Lanaro 2006). I would like to go further 
than these traditional explanations, emphasizing the symbolic, cultural, politi-
cal and ideological factors that had also led to the abandonment of public navi-
gation. 
In this article, I will argue that in addition to this context of economic diffi-
culty and changes in the international balance of trade, other essential trans-
formations must be taken into consideration in order to understand the progres-
sive abandonment of the system. Economic organisation and how it changes 
over time cannot be understood merely by examining the immediate interests 
of economic actors. The organisation and infrastructure of the economy are 
embedded in moral conceptions, ideological agendas and political representa-
tions, which explain in part their success or failure (Polanyi 1944; Granovetter 
1985). This article seeks to reintegrate economic considerations, practices, 
actions and actors into their social, political and ideological contexts, and thus 
avoids isolating economic phenomena and economic thinking from their politi-
cal background. In a sense, we could argue that the concept of the “moral 
economy of the poor” defined by Edward P. Thompson as “a consistent tradi-
tional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions 
of several parties within the community” could be transferred to other domains 
of the political economy (Thompson 1975, 79; Fassin 2009). Why not consider 
a moral economy of the rich, the implications of which are obviously different 
from those defined by Thompson, but with similar principles of analysis.  
Therefore, I will focus on public galleys, particularly highlighting the way in 
which trade was organised by the State and private investors, and the terms and 
conditions of economic practices. I will consider the public navigation in its 
economic dimension, as well as in its political and symbolic one. Trust, collec-
tive responsibility, honour and reputation were all factors that came into play in 
the management of the galleys, together with profit and economic performance. 
So here I will stress the importance of the relationship between the State and 
the patricians, and on the specific definitions of the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ 
that arose from this specific relationship. As we will see, public navigation was 
a system perfectly matching the assimilation that existed in medieval Venice 
between the State and the patricians, the public and the private, and politics and 
economics. 
And yet in the sixteenth century, political structures and representations 
were changing. The definition of public good and of the State were adjusted 
throughout the century, particularly due to a parallel transformation in the 
definition of the patriciate. The history of public navigation and more broadly 
of the Venetian economy, were determined by the early modern transformation 
of the public and private spheres. The differentiation between the ruling class 
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and the State apparatus led to a new definition of public institutions and public 
authority. I will argue here that the abandonment of public navigation in Ven-
ice, beyond the economic and political contexts, was a corollary of this gradual 
differentiation between the State and the ruling class that was typical of the 
earliest stages of modernity. In sixteenth-century Venice, the change in eco-
nomic practices was one of the signs of the emergence of a new state configu-
ration. The economic organisation of public galleys offers therefore an ideal 
case study to illuminate the transformation of the State at the beginning of the 
early modern period. 
This article will first consider public navigation showing the ways in which 
it was typical of the medieval Venetian definition of the State and public au-
thority, and the important public implications of this economic organisation. 
The Mediterranean economic and political conditions that brought about the 
process of decline will then be analysed, before focusing on the transformation 
of the balance between private interests and public good, from an economic as 
well as a political point of view. I will finally argue that abandoning the medie-
val system of public galleys was one of the consequences, as well as one of the 
manifestations, of the emergence of a new form of statehood in Venice. 
2.  The State, the Patriciate and the Public Economy 
The genesis of the medieval Venetian economic infrastructure is inseparable 
from the genesis of the State and of the Venetian ruling group (Luzzatto 1961; 
Gonzalez de Lara 2008). Between the late thirteenth century and the first half 
of the next century, a group of powerful families managed to impose them-
selves at the head of the main institutions, basing their legitimacy on belonging 
to the Great Council. The long process of the Serrata between 1280 and 1320 
allowed the definition of a privileged group of noblemen – the patricians – to 
allocate for themselves the monopoly of political power (Rösch 2000).1  
Most of them owed their position to their economic influence and power. In 
the fourteenth century, the vast majority of wealthy patricians were merchants 
and investors in international trade or in the craft industry. As patricians were 
considered to be merchants, and as merchants’ business was seen as the foun-
dation of the common good, patricians claimed that they could at the same time 
defend both their private interests and the interest of the community. Through-
out the sixteenth century, the political image of patricians being originally 
merchants continued to be used regularly in the rhetoric employed by the ruling 
group (De Vivo 2007, 87-8). 
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Of course, dominant groups identifying their specific interests with the 
common good was a standard political feature of discourse in the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance. Yet in Venice, it was the patriciate, not the king or the 
emperor, who embodied sovereignty. The functions of the prince were per-
formed by the doge, but authority was held above all by the patrician group 
who considered its own interests as one with the community’s interests. Power 
was owned and exercised by collective institutions such as the Great Council, 
the Signoria or the Collegio. Because every patrician was a member of the 
Great Council, and by consequence could be elected to the different assem-
blies, the patriciate as a whole constituted the State. 
During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, this theoretical model of a pa-
triciate embodying the State was also possible because of the relative equiva-
lence between the number of patricians and the number of public offices  
(Zannini 1996; Cozzi 1973, 208). Patricians were elected for short periods of 
time, generally no more than two years, and a rapid rotation of offices was 
agreed. This was intended to prevent the ‘professionalization’ of political staff, 
but also guaranteed the circulation of power within the patriciate. In practice, a 
majority of patricians participated in the exercise of public authority which 
reinforced this model of the convergence between public and private interests 
and the idea of equivalence between the State and the patriciate. 
As a matter of fact, the State was the patriciate because, apart from a few 
exceptions, the majority of the members of the Great Council were regularly 
elected to government or administrative offices and were involved in State 
management. Furthermore, at least until the fifteenth century, the same patri-
cians were in charge of public institutions and of the management of the major 
economic structures. The same individuals made the rules that organised eco-
nomic structures and then operated them as well. They represented the ambigu-
ity which was the basis of economic action in Venice. Patricians, economic 
actors as well as trustees of public authority, were conscious of the blending 
between their public and private functions, and this constituted one of the legit-
imations of their power. 
As a consequence, the ‘public’ was not defined in and of itself, but emerged 
from patricians’ actions in ‘public’ situations (Goodman 1992). Since the patri-
ciate was the State, the same patricians embodied public or private interests 
depending on the timing and intent of their action (Mackenney 1998). It was 
the situation and the purpose of their activity which characterised the nature of 
their actions, more than their personal identity or their functions. In 1525, a 
Senate deliberation recalled that a patrician who refused a mission abroad 
(“ambassaria, provedaria o altra”) damaged his own interest as well as the 
public one (“l’utile si suo come pubblico”)2. Patricians were conscious of this 
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1525. 
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convergence as the report made by the ambassador Giovanni Michiel, coming 
back from England in 1557, shows. Speaking about a present offered by the 
King, he said he could not accept it, “neither as a private person, neither as a 
public person”.3 
Consequently, we cannot consider the State and the patriciate as two sepa-
rate entities; the two institutions have to be considered as having a dialectical 
relationship. Public authority and its expression was the result of the peculiar 
relationship between public institutions, the government, and the ruling elite. 
As a consequence, it would not be accurate to separate the public and the pri-
vate dimension of patricians’ economic and political actions. The same patri-
cian would defend the common good when he was in a situation acting as a 
political official, but would protect his own private interests in business situa-
tions. Private and public spheres, from a political as well as an economic point 
of view, were not separated inherently, but depended on the situation. 
From this point of view, the public navigation of galleys, created at the be-
ginning of the fourteenth century, constituted an organisation perfectly adapted 
to the blending of the public and private functions and roles of the Venetian 
patricians. Indeed, the system was based precisely on this combination of pri-
vate and public interests. Convoys of public galleys were instituted in order to 
redeem the costs of building the fleet. The idea was to use the largest galleys 
during peace time for commercial trips, which would navigate in annual con-
voys – the mude (as in other places in Italy: Mallett 1967; Kirk 2005). A legal 
and institutional framework was quickly established, creating norms and rules 
that controlled trade and protected ships and merchants. Galleys were safe 
ships because they sailed in convoys and because of the two hundred oarsmen 
who were free men rather than slaves, who had to help defend the ship in case 
of attack. Being particularly safe, but of limited capacity, they only transported 
profitable and luxury goods. 
The convoys were closely related to another public infrastructure, the re-
nowned Arsenale, created at the beginning of the twelfth century. It was one of 
the first Venetian ‘public firms’, and played an important part in the dynamism 
of commercial structures (Lane 1934; Bellavitis 1983; Concina 1984; Davis 
1991; Caniato 1996). Financed by the State, the shipyard employed many 
workers who were in charge of the building and maintenance of the communal 
fleet. This is where the galleys were built. 
The specificity of the convoys was their associated public and private man-
agement and their public and private actors. The State rented the vessels to 
private investors who joined together in temporary companies for the occa-
sion.4 In order to guarantee the public nature of the enterprise, auctions (incan-
to) were organised. Only patricians were allowed to take part in these auctions, 
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so becoming the galley’s patrono (the ship captain) meant they had the monop-
oly on the management of the galleys and, consequently, on the trade in the 
most precious merchandise. Citizens could not participate in auction, but could, 
however, invest in the capital in association with the patricians (Grubb 2000).  
A tacit and unanimous agreement claimed that every patrician in Venice had 
the chance to take advantage of maritime trade income. Public discourses regu-
larly repeated how it was wise to guarantee egalitarianism among patricians 
(Romano 2009). Concerning the prices of merchandise, for example, the Senate 
claimed that it was “advisable to use equality for everyone.”5 In 1527, the 
Collegio declared that a “just Republic cannot tolerate that one is advantaged 
compared with another, and that everybody must be equal as is honest and 
fair.”6 
This agreement rested on a set of conventions which linked together rulers, 
patroni of galleys, sailors, oarsmen, merchants and investors. I will consider 
here a convention as “a system of mutual expectations about competences and 
behaviours, which are designed to be self-evident and for the purpose of being 
self-evident” (Salais 1989, 213; Diaz-Bone Salais 2011). In a way, this defini-
tion recalls the “institution” as defined by Avner Greif, “a system of social 
factors that conjointly generate a regularity of behavior (…) a system of rules, 
beliefs, norms, and organizations that together generate a regularity of (social 
behavior)” (Greif 2006, 30). The conventions at the root of public navigation 
were built on a compromise, a tacit agreement between the patricians on the 
one hand – economic actors as well as trustees of public authority – and be-
tween the patricians and their partners on the other. These conventions were 
based on trust and were facilitated by the general conception of the balance 
between public good and private interests (on the subject of trust see Muldrew 
1998; Fontaine 2008). They precisely aligned with the great Venetian narrative 
that connected the fate of the merchants and that of the Serenissima; a model 
still valid – at least rhetorically – in the sixteenth century. “Everybody knows 
that the fact that merchandise is brought to this city by galleys is important for 
the public good as well as the private,”7 claimed the Senators in 1500. 
In fact, the public navigation was organised in such a way that it clearly sat-
isfied at the same time private interests and public good, which were embodied 
by the same persons: patricians. At the end of the trip, the State and the inves-
tors split the profits in half, and the individual investors were paid in proportion 
to their investment (Tucci 1981a). The system was therefore based on a clear 
distribution of expenditure and profits between the State and private investors. 
The former was in charge of the more demanding investment of shipbuilding 
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and maintenance, leaving the patrician merchants to focus on the voyage, fi-
nancing equipment, salaries and arranging for cargo. 
The patricians involved in the organisation received considerable benefits 
from the system. In addition to their commercial profits, they obtained an im-
portant subsidy and enjoyed the advantage of efficient public institutions, in-
cluding an official network around the Mediterranean and in Europe (Ashtor 
1983; Arbel 1996; Dursteler 2007; O’Connell 2009; Christ 2012). Officials 
were in charge of defending Venetian merchants, whether they were travelling 
or living in foreign cities. The good reputation of Venetian trade as well as the 
general public policy of support resulted in high profits for the merchants and 
businessmen of the Republic. 
By virtue of the specificity of this organization, and the balance between 
public and private interests, galleys had to fulfil important public missions 
which were essential in defining their activity (Judde de Larivière 2002). First 
of all, they had military functions. They were originally warships and could be 
requisitioned at any time. In case of danger or in wartime, they had to join the 
fleet (Armada) in order to defend Venetian interests (Lane 1957). Secondly, 
public galleys also played an important role in the fiscal structure of the Vene-
tian State and they generated flows of merchandise and customs duties. Their 
success was consequently a source of public income. Finally, the regularity of 
the convoys as well as their efficiency guaranteed the reputation and honour of 
Venice around the Mediterranean and in Europe, which benefitted Venetian 
merchants as well as the State. 
Both private and public actors benefited and that is essential to understand-
ing the success of the organisation as well as its longevity. In fact, the mude 
were not, in terms of volume and value, the largest Venetian commercial infra-
structure. Private ships were much more numerous, and the total amount of 
their cargoes could be ten times more than the galleys’ cargoes (Lane 1934, 
240). Venetian merchants had at their disposal these two types of efficient 
commercial organisation, both public galleys and private round ships, which 
coexisted and collaborated fruitfully (Hocquet 1991; Judde de Larivière 2005). 
Nevertheless, public galleys embodied the fortune of Venice as no other system 
did because of the political and ideological dimension of that organisation. 
Public navigation therefore combined real economic and symbolic benefits. 
From an economic point of view, convoys presented many advantages: safety, 
regularity, reputation, and profitability. But from a symbolic perspective, the 
system also perfectly matched the ideological, political and social frameworks 
of medieval Venice, the conception of honour and reputation. Beyond the role 
convoys played in commercial traffic, they were a way for patricians to express 
and display their public functions in the economic field, to defend the honour 
of the State and themselves. The system was one of the resources that enabled 
the perpetuation of patrician authority and aided the ruling group to maintain its 
power.  
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The functioning of public navigation can only be understood in this articula-
tion between the economic rationality of the actors and their pursuit of profit on 
the one hand, and that of their public and political actions on the other. The 
public navigation involved a system of exchange as well as norms and obliga-
tions. In this sense, we can speak about a “moral economy”, a system embed-
ded in a set of political and ideological considerations that were essential to 
understanding its success. This explains why the public galleys remained a 
dynamic organisation until the end of the fifteenth century.  
3.  Sixteenth-Century Transformations 
From the sixteenth century, a general process of decline affected Venetian 
public navigation. This decline was gradual and continuous (Doumerc Stöckly 
1995; Doumerc Judde de Larivière 1998; Judde de Larivière 2008). In the 
second half of the fifteenth century, around 12 to 14 galleys navigated every 
year. From 1510, there were only four or five each year, and after 1540, fewer 
than three galleys a year. The last convoy organised in a traditional way sailed 
in 1569. Considering the complexity and importance of this system in the Ve-
netian economy, multiple levels of explanation need to be sought for this de-
cline, looking at the economic and political contexts as well as social actors’ 
perceptions and reactions.  
First of all, political and economic circumstances, both Venetian and inter-
national, partly explain the general decrease of public navigation. Sixteenth-
century political events created an uncertain context for commercial navigation 
and trade. Diplomatic tensions and wars resulted in unsafe international cir-
cumstances as, for example, the Ottoman advance in the Eastern Mediterrane-
an, the Italian wars, and the Spanish threat in North Africa. Public navigation 
suffered particularly from this fragile political context, resulting in the cancel-
lation of several convoys throughout the sixteenth century (Lane 1973). The 
Venetian economy was affected by these operations and for many years the 
budget of the city was largely dictated by the exigencies of war. The ruling 
elite had to focus on military and political issues, and economic matters were 
relatively neglected. This shift is clear when reading the Senate or the Great 
Council deliberations. From the 1540s, the majority of debates, particularly in 
the Senate series da mar (dealing with sea-based issued), were focused on the 
military fleet, its maintenance and its operations, and no longer on commercial 
navigation.8 
Intensification of the activity of pirates and privateers also worsened the cir-
cumstances for public galleys (Tenenti 1960). Moreover, new European com-
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petitors were challenging Venetian hegemony. With the shifting of the centre 
of trade from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic coasts, Venice was losing its 
centrality. The Portuguese were among the most serious competitors in the 
spice market (Teixeira Marques de Oliveira 2000). At the same time, the 
French and Spanish kingdoms, and Italian and Dalmatian cities were also rein-
forcing their position in the European market (Mallett 1967; Malanima 1985; 
Kirk 2005). Jewish merchants also became serious competitors for the Vene-
tians (Arbel 1995, 2001).  
The international economic and political circumstances were clearly not fa-
vourable for Venetian maritime trade. The consequences on public convoys 
were evident. Nevertheless, it was not the first time public galleys had had to 
face problems and unfortunate circumstances. Consequently, we need to focus 
on the way rulers and investors adapted their practices and discourses to these 
circumstances. Their actions reflected political choices and specific cultural 
conceptions. The answers given depended on their political and economic 
choices, on their moral and cultural views as much as on the economic situa-
tion. 
4.  Private Interests vs. Public Good 
From an economic point of view, the individuals involved in trade and the 
management of the galleys, confronted with the fragile economic and political 
context, had to make choices to adapt to the new context. Patricians considered 
new management methods, in which a new conception of public organisation 
was clearly emerging. Many small and apparently unimportant modifications 
were made to the running of the mude. Threatened and weakened, the Venetian 
rulers had to apply a pragmatic policy in order to adapt navigation to current 
circumstances. Itineraries, ports of call, deadlines, and the volume and nature 
of the merchandise were constantly altered. The frequency and the intensity of 
these changes eventually transformed the principles of commercial navigation 
in profound ways. The regularity of convoys was no longer guaranteed, and 
thus the whole system was at risk. The commercial reputation of Venetian 
merchants was weakened and their businesses were experiencing difficulty. 
In addition, after 1500, the number of investors in public navigation con-
stantly declined, with a corresponding increase in the size of their investment. 
From the 1520s, companies were generally composed of no more than two 
investors. A transition had occurred: large companies made up of many inves-
tors were replaced by small ones with a limited number of investors who were 
sharing the available capital. Consequently, there were fewer patricians and 
cittadini involved in the system. From 1495 to 1500, there were more than 250 
of them but half a century later, there were no more than thirty, and all of them 
were members of a few family-based networks. 
HSR 37 (2012) 4  │  85 
Some investors established the so called “maone”, commercial association 
considered illegal by the Senate. The maona was an effective means for impos-
ing power and authority, for example by directing all convoys in one year and 
by removing other potential investors. Maone and cartels were in opposition to 
Venetian principles, which claimed that political balance was established on 
the equality of patricians. In 1505, Antonio Tron, savio del consiglio, tried to 
ban them in order to respect the “bene universal.” 9 
This restriction of the number of patricians involved confirms the general ol-
igarchical tendency identified by scholars for the sixteenth century in Venice 
(Finlay 1980; De Vivo 2007, 28 sq.). At least during the first half of the six-
teenth century and before the sector became obsolete in the 1550s, some of the 
most influential patricians monopolized the profits to be made. In this new 
configuration, public galleys lost their traditional collective dimension. Corpo-
rate governance was no longer a reality.  
Another key aspect is that investors appeared ready to multiply the ways to 
circumvent the law in order to increase their profits. Public navigation was 
organised by a set of laws and conventions (Zordan 1991). Actors obeyed 
different norms and respected tacit agreements defined by a common trust. But 
throughout the sixteenth century, every moment of the trip gave rise to illegal 
tactics, from the auctions to the constitution of the company and throughout the 
trip itself. Patroni and investors would not hesitate to alter their itineraries, or 
the duration of their stay in ports of call, when they thought they could increase 
their profits by doing so (Judde de Larivière 2008, chap. 4). The overloading of 
galleys, an ancient scam, was never resolved by the rulers neither was the 
smuggling, which consisted of merchants and managers trying to trade mer-
chandise without paying taxes and customs duties (Lane 1962).10 
Certainly, none of these tricks were invented in the sixteenth century. They 
were overused stratagems, perfected year after year, in order to escape State 
control and increase profits. Nevertheless, these practices took on a different 
meaning in a context of decline, in which the number of investors was falling. 
These illicit practices were making an already difficult situation worse. Inves-
tors and patroni no longer followed some of the tacit shared assumptions, i.e. 
the conventions that had supported public navigation for more than two centu-
ries.  
On several occasions, it would appear that investors opposed the captain of 
the convoy, the patrician public officer responsible for enforcing the law and 
imposing the terms of the incanto during the navigation, although he represent-
ed the State, the common good, and the Venetian community as a whole. Dur-
ing the sixteenth century, many captains complained of the lack of respect 
                                                             
9  ASV, Senato, Mar, reg. 16, fol. 60, 25 February 1505. 
10  See, for example, ASV, Senato, Mar, reg. 15, fol. 160-160v, 2 January 1503; Collegio, Nota-
torio, reg. 20, fol. 39v, 22 April 1525 ; fol. 129-130, 22 August 1527. 
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merchants and investors showed them. In their relazione, the reports they had 
to pronounce in front of the Senate after their return to Venice, several of them 
criticized the unfairness of the incanto or expressed the feeling that the law 
they had to follow no longer made sense.11 In January 1533, for example, the 
captain and the patroni of the convoy of Flanders were opposed12. The Senators 
decided to intervene in order to restore the “justice and honour of our state.”13 
The Avogaria di Comun led the investigation, in particular against one of the 
patroni, Maffeo Bernardo, who was accused of trying to escape paying tax 
causing “the dishonour of our state and harm no less great for travel and cose 
nostre”. 
The refusal of the public navigation actors to fulfil their public missions as 
well as their military obligation was clear. The attitude of economic actors 
regarding their military commitment changed in parallel with the transfor-
mation of the fleet. Patricians who invested in public navigation knew that they 
would have to join the Armada on some occasions, but the subsidy they re-
ceived was regarded as compensation for that risk. Yet, investors showed 
themselves increasingly reluctant to fulfil military commitments.  
In 1499, after the battle of Zonchio against the Ottomans, the behaviour of 
the patroni of the public galleys provoked a scandal, and their cowardice was 
denounced (Zille 1945; Lane 1973). They were accused of having shown little 
enthusiasm for fighting, not having seen their military mission as a priority, and 
thus, favouring their business interests. According to Girolamo Priuli, who 
used a typical rhetoric, “Venetian citizens preferred their life than honour and 
glory,”14 when they were expected to prefer “the patria more than them-
selves.”15 The patroni and the captain were imprisoned and brought to justice16. 
These accusations and denunciations revealed a new tension between the actors 
of the public navigation and the State. The reluctance of merchant galleys 
patroni to have to join the Armada in the successive years confirms this trend17.  
Like the majority of European states at this time, Venice was establishing a 
specialised and professionalised armed fleet (Guilmartin 1974, 194sq., 253sq.; 
Glete 1993; Sicking 2004, 458 sq.). The defence of the lagoon and the Adriatic 
required safer and more efficient infrastructure. Technically, progress in gun-
powder, canons, arms, and soldiers’ equipment justified the existence of a 
                                                             
11  ASV, Collegio, Relazioni, busta 61, fol. 27, 22 May 1525. 
12  ASV, Senato, Mar, reg. 22, fol. 161v -162, 23 January 1533. 
13  ASV, Senato, Mar, reg. 22, fol. 162v , 27 January 1533 ; fol. 163v , 31 January 1533. 
14  Priuli, Girolamo. I Diarii. A. Segre and R. Cessi eds. Rerum Italicarum Scriptores. t. XXIV, vol. 
1, p. 281, March 1500. 
15  ASV, Senato, Terra, reg. 14, fol. 29v , 13 June 1501. 
16  Sanudo, Marin. I Diarii, vol. 2, col. 1296, 1329, September 1499, vol. 3, col. 66-67, 16 De-
cember 1499. Priuli, Girolamo. I Diarii, vol. 1, p. 223-224, November 1499. See also ASV, 
Avogaria di Comun, Raspe, b. 3659, fol. 16v , 25 septembre 1500. 
17  See, for example, ASV, Senato, Mar, reg. 15, fol. 150v -51, 11 January 1501. 
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specialised fleet. Public galleys, both commercially and militarily, seemed 
obsolete – they were losing their relevancy. The mixture of commercial and 
military functions no longer corresponded with new military policies in Eu-
rope. This clearer distinction between a military fleet and a commercial one fed 
the unwillingness of patricians to fulfil military functions while at the same 
time managing merchant galleys, leading to the end of the requisition of galleys 
during the sixteenth century. As a consequence, during the war against the 
Ottomans from 1537-1540, public commercial navigation had to be suspended 
instead of requisitioning the mude. 
To summarize this complex transformation, we saw that on the one hand, 
there were fewer and fewer patricians able to take advantage of the system; 
and, on the other hand, those patricians did no longer fulfil their public respon-
sibilities and commitments, for example they did not want to serve in the Ar-
mada, tried to avoid paying duties, and did not satisfy merchants’ demands. 
They could not be trusted anymore. In these conditions, the traditional spice 
trade monopoly of the public galleys could no longer be justified. Until this 
time, this monopoly had been considered as compensation for patricians who 
collaborated with the State and depended on certain conditions; participation in 
military operations, transparent management, regular payment of taxes, duties 
and salaries, and respect of the principle of equality and equal access to the 
system for all patricians. When these principles were rejected in the sixteenth 
century, it seemed that actors were betraying the tacit convention that had 
allowed the system to persist until this time. 
In the new economic context characterised by competition, public naviga-
tion did not seem well-adapted or efficient. The regularity and the monopoly of 
the medieval convoys had vanished. Public navigation had become an overly 
complicated and restrictive system, too difficult to control. The costs of protec-
tion and of surveillance were too high in comparison with the profits and no 
longer justified the continuance of public navigation. As for the investors them-
selves, the system was no longer financially attractive. The incanto rules were 
too restrictive when held up against the few advantages that the system now 
offered. These rules previously had been justified by the monopoly that galleys 
enjoyed, but in the sixteenth century they no longer made sense in the context 
of strong competition from foreign merchants as well as from private Venetian 
navigation. 
The theoretical discourse that had sustained the activity during the Middle 
Ages, based on a conception of equality and homogeneity within the patriciate, 
no longer matched the reality. The balance and consensus at the base of official 
discourse and political rhetoric – the idea of the perfect overlapping of public 
and private interests – were not anymore a possible ideal. For decades, public 
navigation had represented the paradigm of the Venetian economy, the model 
of a State-regulated economy which allows private interests and public good to 
converge. Yet in the sixteenth century, the principles of the public navigation 
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system were hotly debated by the actors involved, who denounced its numerous 
inconsistencies. The mude no longer seemed suited to the new political concep-
tion of economy and public action. 
5.  State and Patriciate in Sixteenth-Century Venice:  
A New Relationship 
If we now take into account the political context in which these various trans-
formations took place, we understand better what happened to the pub-
lic/private balance. As a long and rich historiography devoted to society and 
politics in sixteenth-century Venice has outlined, demographic and political 
characteristic of the noble group transformed at this time (Finlay 1980;  
Chojnacki 1994; Chojnacki 2000). The population of Venice increased regular-
ly throughout the century and reached its peak in the 1570s, with a population 
estimated at 170,000 inhabitants (Beltrami 1954, 57; Todesco 1989, 134). The 
noble group roughly followed this tendency, with a large increase during the 
first three decades of the century. The enlargement of the patrician group had 
profound consequences, particularly from a political point of view, because the 
general balance between available political offices and the number of patricians 
was disappearing. At the end of the fifteenth century, there were 765 offices 
available, while the members of the Great Council already numbered between 
2000 and 2400 (Zannini 1996, 438, 461-2 for the list of offices). In 1520, the 
members of the Senate declared:  
The number of zentilhomeni having grown considerably, it is necessary for the 
sake of justice and equality to do whatever necessary so that all may partici-
pate in political offices or rezimenti, as has always been the intention of our 
State, as can be clearly seen in its laws.18 
All the patricians could not serve the State, and competition escalated within 
the group with the more influential patricians seeking to obtain the more pow-
erful and prestigious offices (Finlay 1980, 74 sq.). Many other patricians who 
were suffering from relative poverty merely sought paid offices rather than 
prestigious ones. The question of poor patricians became a crucial political 
issue during the first half of the century (Pullan 1971, 229-30; Cozzi 1973, 208; 
Cowan 1982). The noble group had always contained a margin of poor patri-
cians, but economic and political difficulties were exacerbating the problem. 
The conception of poverty lost the respectable and sacred dimension it had held 
during the Middle Ages, linked with a Christian notion of charity. Poor nobles 
were no longer considered as part of the patriciate group, and the inability to 
pay taxes represented a reason for exclusion from the Great Council. The Ve-
                                                             
18  ASV, Senato, Terra, reg. 21, fol. 98v, 20 March 1520. 
HSR 37 (2012) 4  │  89 
netian chronicler Girolamo Priuli even claimed that three quarters of patricians 
should have been considered as poor as they were dependent on the salary of 
their political offices to survive (Finlay 1980, 75). 
This process reinforced internal hierarchies within the patriciate. A clearer 
boundary distinguished different groups depending on the level of wealth, 
prestige or power. From a political point of view as well as from an economic 
one, these distinctions strengthened, and the ideal of a unique and unified dom-
inant group no longer corresponded with reality. Egalitarian discourse contin-
ued to be employed by some patricians, but it no longer represented reality. 
Defenders of the public navigation could support the system by claiming it 
allowed the benefit of all but in fact it did not. 
To some extent, the cittadini participated in this phenomenon, thanks to the 
strengthening of their legal recognition throughout the sixteenth century  
(Zannini 1993; Bellavitis 1995; Grubb 2000). Following decades of demands, 
cittadini originari gained the monopoly on positions in the bureaucracy. The 
uffici di ministero, all administrative offices, were reserved for the cittadini 
originari, now in charge of the administration of the State and public institu-
tions. Of course, the cittadini did not take part in political deliberations, and 
could not vote on laws. But they certainly played a role in state management 
and now had an official status which gave them new social prestige and honor-
ability. They were part of the State, the seconda corona, and were recognised 
as agents and executors of patrician decisions. There were economic benefits as 
well, and many cittadini became wealthier and more influential economic 
actors. After decades spent accumulating capital, they were able to impose 
themselves in markets, and particularly in commercial navigation. In doing so, 
they managed to take advantage of the galleys’ decline and, thanks to their 
private ships, they gradually conquered the markets that had been lost by public 
galleys. 
Facing the threat from this competitive group, patricians attempted to pro-
tect the purity and exclusivity of their status. In 1506, the libro d’oro was cre-
ated – in which noble births had to be registered – and new legislation was 
created regarding marriage between nobles and non-nobles. Stanley Chojnacki 
has identified these elements as parts of a ‘third serrata,’ a third step in the 
‘closing up’ of the frontiers of nobility (Crescenzi 1996; Chojnacki 2000). Yet, 
this legal definition could not stop the growing internal divisions within the 
patriciate and the fact that public authority itself was fracturing. 
In the middle of the sixteenth century, the State and the patriciate were no 
longer one and the same, not only because the patriciate was no longer a coher-
ent group, but also because it no longer monopolised political and economic 
power. All the patricians were not taking part in the government and could not 
claim their part of public authority. Numerous hierarchies divided the group, 
and the Venetian State did not emanate from a unique and homogenous com-
munity. Different persons, with divergent interests, claimed to represent the 
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State and public interests. The patrician writer Gasparo Contarini recognised 
this new situation when he declared that only the most honest and the wisest 
men were more interested in the public good than in their private interests 
(Bowd 2000, 88). The definition of public good was not firmly agreed, and, as 
a consequence, the public and private were being redefined. Economic proce-
dures, and particularly public navigation, were strongly affected by these 
changes. 
6.  Conclusion 
The abandonment of public navigation, which had symbolised the maritime 
and commercial domination of Venice in the late Middle Ages, signified a 
turning point in the economic development of the city. Commercial navigation 
had irrevocably altered, as the functions of private individuals and of the State 
were transformed throughout the sixteenth century. In fact, the private maritime 
sector actually improved at the same time, leaving more space for non-patrician 
investors and for a system which was easier to manage in the new economic 
and political international context (Tucci 1981b; Tucci 1987).  
A combination of exogenous and endogenous factors drove the transfor-
mation, with the economic process embedded in the more complex phenome-
non of the transformation of the Venetian State. Public navigation had consti-
tuted an economic organisation adapted to the political and ideological frame-
work of the late Middle Ages. It perfectly illustrated the convergence between 
public good and private interests, the overlapping between the interests of the 
State and those of private investors. Yet, the political changes of the sixteenth 
century and the redefinition of the private and public upset medieval traditions. 
There was no longer one coherent patriciate that could at the same time claim 
to be the defender of the public good and of their private interests, and the ideal 
of an egalitarian group had disappeared. The medieval Venetian economy has 
been based on the fact that there was a convergence between the economic and 
political functions of patricians, and that public and private interests were not 
distinct. This model could no longer be defended in the sixteenth-century cir-
cumstances and, as such, public navigation could no longer be justified.  
What defined, until the sixteenth century, Venetian patricians’ power, as 
well as that of other rulers in the Middle Ages, was the blending between polit-
ical and economic functions as well as between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’. 
The public galleys were a typical expression of this phenomenon. Their aban-
donment was a corollary of the gradual distinction between these functions. 
This dissociation between politics and economics as well as between public 
and private spheres can be considered one characteristic of ‘modernity.’ The 
model of the state should be considered more as paradigm than as reality, an 
ideal helping us to conceptualise the gradual transition from ‘medieval’ politi-
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cal practice towards a ‘modern’ State. However, the transformations of com-
mercial navigation in sixteenth-century Venice clearly reflect one aspect of this 
process of dissociation between political power and economic power, between 
public and private spheres, typical of new forms of government in sixteenth-
century Europe. 
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